OAN Commentary by: Kenin M. Spivak
Monday, June 29, 2026
Support for the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by the United States and Iran to end Operation Epic Fury relies on intentionally imprecise drafting and pronouncements made by the president and vice president that conflict with the MOU and Iran’s view of it, alignment with Iran, or a desire to see Donald Trump fail.
The MOU was poorly drafted to obtain Iran’s acquiescence. Trump wanted an off ramp, while Iran was a reluctant participant brought along by promises of money, time, and a winnowing of U.S. demands. In the week since I wrote about the MOU, both parties have repeatedly breached it; Trump and Vice President JD Vance have re-imagined the deal as the one Trump sought instead of the MOU Trump signed; Iran hijacked the first negotiating session to make it about Israel, rather than Iran’s nuclear program; Vance joined the anti-Israel caravan with repeated harsh criticism of its government; and both parties launched military attacks and threatened to end negotiations.
Meanwhile, the MOU conflicts with the Trilateral Framework signed on Friday by the U.S., Israel, and Lebanon, which the State Department fairly describes as “a clear and structured process to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty, disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure, and enable Israel to return to its borders once that threat to its citizens is removed.” The administration should be as proud of the Framework as it should be embarrassed by the MOU.
Trump launched Epic Fury to ensure that Iran would never have nuclear weapons, destroy its missile capabilities and navy, stop it from arming, funding, and directing its terrorist proxies, and give hope to its people. The air campaign and blockade made major strides in achieving the objectives.
An armistice should be measured by the same goals.
Trump maintains that the MOU is an interim step that either leads to an outstanding final agreement or a resumption of bombing that would finish the job. The former would mean that much of the MOU is pointless, and the latter is unlikely, particularly before the midterm elections.
At high level, the MOU consists of:
- Immediately binding provisions, including re-opening the Strait of Hormuz, prohibiting the parties from making threats, and Iran’s receipt of $24 billion of blocked funds and up to $500 million of oil revenue per day. The payments won’t be refunded if negotiations fail. Last week, Trump claimed that Iran agreed to spend its $24 billion to purchase U.S. medicine and agriculture. Iran disagreed. Because money is fungible and Iran can use funds it would have used to buy food to re-arm, this is spin. Also last week, Iran breached the key binding provision by claiming that it was closing the Strait because Israel defended itself against Hezbollah’s attacks. Trump then breached by threatening to seize the Strait, destroy Iran, and kill its negotiators. Iran responded by attacking commercial vessels in the Strait and announcing that safe passage “cannot be guaranteed.” Since then, the U.S. has struck Iranian missile, drone, and radar sites, and Iran has attacked additional ships, Bahrain, and Kuwait. On Saturday, Trump posted that the U.S. may be forced to “militarily complete the job that we very successfully started.”
- A non-binding letter of intent, consisting of principles intended to be incorporated in the final agreement. The MOU’s supporters suggest that the final agreement also will include protections for the Iranian people, and limit Iran’s nuclear enrichment, ballistic missiles, and terror network. The MOU clearly repudiates the first two and Trump had to forgo the latter two to induce Iran to proceed. Last week, Trump acknowledged that Iran may retain its missiles and civilian nuclear program.
- Provisions favorable to Iran that logically would fall into the second category, but to assuage Iran are drafted as though they fit into the first category.
At a more granular level, the MOU’s 14 points provide:
In Section 1, the U.S. and Iran “declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain [from] the threat or use of force against each other.” This provision is not conditioned on a final agreement. Contrary to the after-signed Framework Agreement, it requires the U.S. to compel Israel to surrender to Hezbollah by ceasing operations in Lebanon, and requires Trump to stop threatening Iran. Neither is realistic. Logically, the reference to “permanent” is aspirational. This section is a testament to Trump’s ardor for a deal.
In Section 2, the parties agree to “refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.” Here, the U.S. agrees to abandon the Iranian people.
In Section 3, the parties agree to negotiate for 60 days, “extendable with mutual consent.” Unless the talks fall apart, we can expect multiple extensions.
Section 4 requires the U.S. to end its blockade within 30 days, and Section 10 requires the U.S. to waive all trade sanctions. The U.S. did both immediately, alleviating pressure on Iran to complete negotiations by allowing it to receive billions of dollars. Section 4 also requires the U.S. to remove its forces from Iran’s “proximity” within 30 days after the final deal. This will have to be defined.
In Section 5, Iran agrees to use “best efforts” to open the Strait of Hormuz, with “no charge for 60 days only.” This stunning provision, already violated by Iran, would give it and Oman control of the Strait, deviating from international treaties on free passage and pre-war practice. Trump claims this provision doesn’t mean what it says and Iran will “never” receive fees.
In Section 6, the U.S. undertakes “with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development” of Iran, and to grant all required licenses, waivers, and permissions. This plan would be subject to the final agreement.
In Section 7, the U.S. agrees to terminate all sanctions, including UN resolutions, in “an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal.” Unlike the immediate sanctions relief in Section 10, this is consistent with the administration’s insistence that relief would be conditions-based. This provision likely will provide Iran a further $100 billion blocked by other countries.
In Section 8, Iran “reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons,” and the parties agree to “resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material … with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site,” and discuss Iran’s “nuclear needs.” Last week, Trump and Vance claimed Iran had agreed immediately to resume UN inspections. Iran denied this. Trump backed down, saying that inspections would occur at “an appropriate time.”
Section 9 affirms that pending a final deal, Iran may maintain the “status quo” of its nuclear program.
In Section 11, the U.S. undertakes to make “fully available” Iran’s frozen and restricted funds and assets, estimated to be at least $24 billion, upon “implementation” of the MOU and agreement on release “procedures.” The funds shall be “fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated” by Iran, potentially including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
Section 12 calls for a mechanism to “monitor” the deal.
Section 13 conditions commencement of negotiations on “beginning” the implementation of Sections 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11, underscoring that those provisions constitute a binding agreement.
Section 14 conditions the final deal on endorsement by a “binding” UN Security Council resolution. There is no reference to approval by the Senate as a treaty.
Those who are unconcerned about Iran, hate America or Israel, or believe in magic are right to support this process. For those who differ, no deal on these terms is the better outcome.
(Views expressed by guest commentators may not reflect the views of OAN or its affiliates.)
Kenin M. Spivak is founder and chairman of SMI Group LLC, an international consulting firm and investment bank. He is the author of fiction and non-fiction books and a frequent speaker and contributor to media, including RealClearPolitics, The American Mind, National Review, television, radio, and podcasts.
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